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Abstract: Conceptualizing the strategic interplay of communication experts with political 
journalists is like being in the middle of so far conflicting approaches. The mostly economic science 
based literature on strategic communication management often implies a prescriptive and rational 
approach of decision making and behavior. From a social sciences perspective, however, the 
empirical transfer of mere economic rational choice models has been reasonably challenged. 
Although many rational choice theorists accept actor rationality to be limited rather than total and 
the metaphor of a “game” between the two groups is frequently used, only tentative efforts of social 
sciences to integrate rational choice models into the concept of strategy can be observed. This 
article seeks to make a case for network analysis to be applied in political media relations, as it 
enables the integration of approaches of strategy that have been kept separate so far. Doing so 
would allow strategic interactions to act as infrastructure for a descriptive analysis and 
environment for testing cost-benefits with the help of game theory. In this way, it allows for both a 
systematic integration of different strategy concepts and a comparative evaluation of their validity 
and explanatory power for empirical ex-post analysis in different social contexts. Developed in the 
German context, a possible comparative approach will be exemplified by the Russian Federation in 
accordance with the most different systems design. 
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Introduction 
 
The fascination over the interplay of politics and the media can be observed in 
countless academic and public debates across countries. The central underlying 
assumption in that context is that political organizations act strategically in order 
to enforce their interests in the public sphere. Yet, interactions between politics 
and the media only occasionally become publicly observable. In Germany, for 
example, a heated public discussion recently evolved around a political 
                                                 
1 This publication was created in the context of the Research Unit “Political Communication in the 
Online World (1381), subproject 6” which is funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 
(DFG, German Research Foundation). 
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spokesperson calling the editorial team of a public broadcasting channel in order 
to prevent negative coverage. Since nationwide TV channels are directly controlled 
by the government in Russia and journalists may have internalized these external 
regulations, this incident probably would not have been publicly observable, as it is 
of no news value for the national media. This example vividly illustrates that (a) 
public reports and news are not appropriate material to study the interplay of 
politics and the media and that (b) the notion of “strategic behavior” is not 
universal but depends on specific contextual factors. 
So far, research focused either on communication management within 
organizations (e.g. Ehling & Dozier, 1992) or on journalistic research methods (e.g. 
Reich, 2009). By applying social network analysis, the interrelatedness of politics 
and the media becomes empirically observable and allows profound insights into 
the interplay of the two. Conceptualizing these interactions with the help of game 
theory then provides a framework to evaluate the actual degree of the “players” 
potentially rational and strategic behavior.  
 
Due to the dominance of journalism studies in communication research, 
interaction between a political organization and the media is often labeled as 
“public relations” (e.g. Schulz, 2008, p. 305). Public relations research, however, 
has a much broader understanding, which also includes the communication 
between other actors connected with or interested in the organization (Grunig & 
Hunt 1984, p. 6). Strömbäck and Kiousis (2011) define political public relations as 
 
“the management process by which an organization or individual actor for political 
purposes, through purposeful communication and action, seeks to influence and to 
establish, build, and maintain beneficial relationships and reputations with its key publics 
to help support its mission and achieve its goals” (ibid., p.8) 
 
Although the authors aimed to integrate social and economic research fields in 
their definition, a prescriptive perspective is clearly presented. The interactions 
with journalists in a narrower sense are frequently referred to as “media relations”. 
Here, too, one finds quite practical definitions. Zoch and Molleda (2006, p. 280) 
describe media relations as  
 
„active process in which the public relations practitioner has, at least, a modicum of control 
over the message she wishes to reach the public, its timing, the source of that information, 
and the effect on the media agenda of the issue presented.“ 
 
No wonder, though, that in communication management as well as in political 
communication research the communication activities of political organizations 
are regarded as strategic, per se. The associated notion of strategic behavior, 
however, is conceivably diverse, as this article will show.  
 
In order to conceptualize the interaction of journalists and communication 
professionals, theoretical reflections frequently call on the metaphor of a “game” 
between the two (see Jarren & Donges, 2006, p. 319; Donsbach, 1993). The 
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systematic connection to theories and methods of interdependent decision making, 
however, mostly fizzles out with the general statement that those interactions 
could principally be analyzed with the help of e.g. game theory (see ibid., p. 58f.; 
Ehling & Dozier, 2002, p. 277ff.). 
 
Empirically seen, different approaches to strategy remain irreconcilably up to now. 
By looking closer at the approaches to strategy in the context of political media 
relations, this article firstly aims to show the potential that may lie in social 
network analysis to integrate these approaches in order to simultaneously describe 
and measure strategy in the political-media communication network. On this 
basis, the implementation of game theory, as well as problems with the application 
of rational choice models in general, will be discussed. Afterwards, this article will 
look at the applicability of the introduced statements in a transcultural 
perspective, illustrated by the Russian Federation that has been chosen in 
accordance with the most different systems design of John Stuart Mill (see Esser, 
2003, p. 466). Finally, it will sum up and conclude the value of the outlined 
considerations for further research. 
 
 
Strategy Concepts in Political Media Relations 
 
Describing and measuring the strategic interplay of communication experts with 
political journalists was so far connected with the commitment to either 
prescriptive management concepts or descriptive political concepts of strategy. 
This section will introduce both approaches and will then make the case for 
network analysis being able to integrate them. 
 
Strategy in Politics 
 
Political communication research understands every communication activity that 
is driven by particular interests as strategic (e.g. Kriesi, 2004; Manheim, 2011). 
The development of the concept of strategy has been described as progress “from 
normative idealism to critical realism” (see Frandsen & Johansen, 2010), which 
means that over time it aimed to draw near social scientific perceptions. Strategy, 
in a political context, is regarded to be in an exploration phase; on the other hand, 
in social sciences descriptive and incremental models are preferred. In this sense, 
strategy can be described only retrospectively by qualitative research designs. Most 
recent is the “strategy as practice”-approach that grounds on action theory and 
understands strategy as the activity of practitioners that are embedded in social 
contexts like organizations and societies (Raschke & Tils, 2010a, p. 11f.; e.g. 
Jarzabkowski, 2005).  
 
Representatives of this view criticize that the ability to act strategically is almost 
always taken for granted. They replace hard data and calculations by a “weighing 
up” of practitioners and differentiate between strategy-thinking (actor’s 
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interpretations) and strategy-making (actual interactions) (Raschke & Tils 2010b, 
p. 367). Political strategy analysis is characterized by a large part of open, “inner” 
strategy processes, complex interrelations between individual and collective action 
as well as between the micro, meso and macro level and the embeddedness of 
strategic processes in historic contextual coherences (ibid., p. 361). Due to the lack 
of reliable information about strategy in the political context, the only chance to 
integrate rational choice is seen in developing it more explicitly and sophisticated 
in the long run (ibid. 373). Using social network analysis may be one way to 
describe the social interrelatedness of actors and inherent consequences for their 
ability to act strategically. For this purpose the social network must be defined in a 
broad sense as a “set of actors connected by a set of ties. The actors (often called 
‘nodes’) can be persons, teams, organizations, concepts, etc.” (Borgatti & Foster, 
2003, p. 992)2. 
 
As strategic communication is considered to be more than a mere voice that 
announces the decisions of the political organizations (see Sarcinelli, 2010), it is 
regarded as an executive function from a social science perspective as well as from 
an economic perspective. 
 
Strategic Communication Management 
 
Strategic management and strategic communication are closely connected within 
literature on communication management (e.g. White & Dozier, 1992). Due to this 
close relationship, prescriptive management understanding and rational choice 
assumptions dominate within this field (e.g. Bentele & Nothhaft, 2007, p. 373; 
Wilson, 2001; Mast, 2006, p. 144ff.; Cutlip, Center & Broom, 2000).  
 
These classical assumptions of efficiency and rationality have been challenged by 
the so-called “Critical Management Studies” (e.g. Phillips & Dar, 2009) as the 
representatives of this view also stress the social embeddedness of the 
communication professionals and therefore doubt the empirical value of rational 
choice assumptions for the description of social situations. Even the literature on 
strategic management notes that the logics of commercial and non-profit 
organizations differ in the strategy selection process (see Lynch, 2009, p. 382). 
From this flexible, complex, and hardly quantifiable understanding of strategy 
selection various new approaches to strategy in strategic management research as 
well as in political organizations emerge.  
 
One of them is the network-based approach that deals with “strategic networks”. 
These networks are regarded as the outflow of a cooperation strategy in order to 
gain competitive advantages (Sydow, 2005, p. 93) and value is placed upon the 
degree of cooperation (Lynch, 2009, p. 429). Such benefit-approaches can also be 
                                                 
2 It thereby follows the formal definition of the research project “Media Relations Online” which is 
funded by the German Research Foundation and which the here outlined concept of a planned 
dissertation is embedded in. 
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found in literature on the management of relationships with the media (e.g. 
Hallahan, 2001). Not surprisingly, communication professionals themselves 
perceive their strategic actions in quite a prescriptive way (Frandsen & Johansen, 
2010). The network approach, though, may be able to integrate the so far 
separated branches of strategy research. 
 
Networks as Bridges between the Approaches 
 
It is important that the term “social networks”, (from the social sciences point of 
view), and the term “strategic networks”, (from an economic science based 
perspective), must be distinguished. Social networks serve as an infrastructure to 
describe the structure of a network, including its size and closure (Scott, 2012; 
Monge & Contractor, 2001, p. 444). The relations between the nodes (e.g. 
organizations or individuals) in the social network can be manifold; they reach 
from membership to reputation attributions up to exchange relations like the 
exchange of information or resources (see Jansen, 2006, p. 75). Strategic 
networks, on the other hand, principally assume a value connected to interactions 
within the network (Lynch, 2009, p. 429). The focus is therefore not on the 
description of the network and derived assumptions about influences on the 
actor’s ability to take strategic action, but on the concrete competitive advantages 
which can arise from cooperation within the network (Sydow, 2005, p. 93). 
 
Nevertheless, it has been theoretically shown that descriptive and prescriptive 
understandings of strategy may be integrated as retrospective and prospective 
sense-making in organizations do not need to exclude one another (Raupp & 
Hoffjann, 2012). Social Network analysis has the great potential to integrate the so 
far separated branches of strategy research even empirically by serving as a frame 
for descriptive analysis, as well as environment for testing cost-benefit-
considerations with the help of game theory in only one research design. Thus, the 
determined structure of the communication network between political and media 
organizations merely reveals, in the first instance, media relations tactics as 
isolated interactions. These may, subsequently, serve as evidence for underlying 
long-term managed strategies of the actors involved (see de Certeau, 1984, p. 29f.). 
In order to evaluate the degree of the involved actors’ tactical behavior using game 
theory, rational choice assumptions need to be applied – a plan that still continues 
to be a big challenge, as the following section will show. 
 
 
The Challenge of Applying Rational Choice 
 
The most difficult point in putting into practice these considerations are the 
scruples connected with a rational choice approach to research political media 
relations. As rational choice models are not seldom considered as to be free of 
subjective expectations and sense making, they are not regarded as being able to 
describe nor to predict social phenomena (see inter alia Denzin, 1990; Zey, 1992; 
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Ward, 2002). Looking more closely at the presumptions of neo-classic economic 
theory this is hardly surprising; it is characterized by tangle incentives for the 
actors, their ability to act in a purely rational manner, non-varying preferences, 
costless transactions and complete information about possible alternatives of 
action and their consequences regarding central assumptions of the actor (see 
Kirchgässner, 1991). 
 
Yet, advocates of the rational choice approach point out its heuristic value (e.g. 
Franz, 2004). Terms like "preferences" and "alternatives of action" are regarded by 
critics as not being connected to specific events and actors (Raschke & Tils 2010b, 
p. 373). Seen positively, this "flexibility" of the rational choice approach, as Braun 
& Gautschi (2011, p. 303) call it, was definitely striking while trying to integrate 
this approach into the research of political media relations (see following section). 
 
As rational choice models do not take sociological background or individual 
perceptions and values of actors into account, they are, however, trivialized 
(Raschke & Tils 2010b, p. 376f.). Yet, even earlier models make allowances for 
influences of the social environment of the actors (e.g. Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; 
Granovetter, 1978). The application of rational choice models in natural situations 
like the interaction within the political-media communication network is difficult 
to implement. Nevertheless, an integration of action-theoretical variables on the 
micro level into a multi-level analysis, as will be outlined later on, is considered a 
crucial step towards a rational choice analysis of social phenomena (Kunz, 2004, p. 
148f.). Furthermore, a multi-step analysis approach keeps the following in mind: 
different logics of action, the interaction patterns between the actors, the 
influences on different levels of analysis, and even temporal relations between 
macro and micro variables (see Blossfeld, 1996; Esser, 1993). 
 
The major problem in rational choice research is the battery of unforeseeable 
variances that challenge the idea of utility maximization. That is why the subjective 
definition of the situation by the actors themselves is considered to be the crucial 
key to deal with those irrationalities (e.g. Esser, 2003; Schulz-Schaeffer, 2008). 
Empirically explanatory perspectives of the rational choice approach should 
therefore be implemented for the case of political media relations.  
 
One of the major issues in modeling political media relations as rational 
interactions is that this field is also strongly formed by habits and routines (e.g. 
press releases, conferences and regular off-the-record conversations). This fact 
seems like an obstacle for the implementation of a rational choice approach as the 
actors may not always rationally maximize their own profit but count on 
established routines. Watkins (1972, p. 353) explains how brushing one’s teeth in 
the morning may be one of the most manifest routine actions, but that this does 
not imply that brushing your teeth is irrational.  
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By integrating all these considerations into the rational choice approach the former 
neo-classical economic assumption of the actor who maximizes his own benefit 
gives way to the assumption of actors with limited mental capacity and rationality 
as well as incomplete information — actors who “satisfice” instead of maximize 
(see Simon, 1978).  
 
That is why Braun and Gautschi (2011, p. 299f.) point out that even if the 
postulation of the continuously optimizing actor is considered as empirically 
invalid, one does not have to give up on the rational choice theory. Instead, the 
authors rather criticize the methodology and operationalization of many rational 
choice studies. Laboratory experiments tend to have a considerable internal 
validity at the expense of external validity. Acceptable predictions could only be 
expected if the decision situation is simply to understand, and incentives, as well 
as a sufficient learning period, are granted. Therefore, Braun and Gautschi (2011) 
conclude that hypotheses derived from a rational choice approach, on the one 
hand, must include former experience, but that they mainly refer to long-term 
relevant behavior that cannot be distorted without effort. That is why the idea of 
researching political media relations with the help of a rational choice approach 
seems so prolific: all named requirements work fine for the idea of researching the 
interactions of political journalists and communication professionals in political 
organizations e.g. with the help of semi-structured interviews. They know best in 
which everyday-situation they are, and one can assume that they are sufficiently 
experienced in interacting with each other. The actors' behavior can, under these 
conditions, be considered more or less stable.  
 
In summary, the way of applying game and network theory to political media 
relations in order to integrate strategy concepts empirically seems as obvious as 
promising. That is why the following section will attempt to show how these 
theoretical ideas can be applied to the concrete context of political media relations. 
 
 
Game Theory and Media Relations 
  
As pointed out in the previous sections, an exhaustive conceptualization and 
theoretical discussion is essential in order to describe and measure the strategic 
interplay of political journalists and communication professionals. It has been 
shown so far that game theory, although frequently referenced in the context of 
media relations (e.g. Jarren & Donges, 2006, p. 319; Donsbach, 1993), cannot be 
applied in a universal sense to the social phenomenon of political media relations. 
Instead, this rational choice approach needs to be integrated into a broader 
understanding of the concept of strategy, which can be done empirically through 
network analysis, as it may serve as a framework for economic, as well as social 
variables. Even when the aforementioned pitfalls and potential of rational choice 
models are considered, their integration into the research on political media 
relations remains promising. This section outlines how game theory can be 
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usefully applied to study the relationships between politics and media. 
 
If the success of the game only depended on the player itself, decision-theoretical 
assumptions could be made. But in the case of media relations, there is an 
interdependent decision situation, which means that the success of one actor 
(respectively: player) also depends on the decisions of other actors within the 
political-media communication network. As the actors influence each other’s 
decision-making processes, game theoretical considerations have to be made. 
Monge and Contractor (2003, p. 293) point out that social network analysis lacks 
theory. This deficit can be met with the application of game theory; an attempt that 
has been considered fruitful within theoretical and methodological reflections of 
public relations (Kleinnijenhuis, 2008; general overview: Kunczik, 2002, p. 274 
ff.). 
 
It makes an important difference in the analysis of game situations whether 
cooperative or non-cooperative game theory is applied. As the former presupposes 
valid, suable contracts (see Diekmann, 2010, p. 15), which are usually not 
concluded between political journalists and communication professionals in 
political organizations, the ideas outlined here have non-cooperative game theory 
as a starting point. It goes without saying that this is a broad-brush approach and 
that this decision is hard to make. A diligent analysis of the social situation in 
which the players meet is needed before statements about rational behavior can be 
made. The application of fixed game scenarios, like Murphy (1991) did for case 
studies of corporate communications in crises, remain on a descriptive level so that 
findings are hardly generalizable. Charron (1989, p. 47) made a case for a 
differentiated game theoretical analysis of media relations by saying “each 
universe is governed by its own rules”.  
 
Following him, one has to define a narrow field in which the introduced concept 
may be applied (e.g. strategic interactions of political journalists and 
communication professionals of political organizations in Germany on the federal 
level). In the German context, these relationships are characterized by both non-
cooperation – for  example, distrust, secrecy and competition (see Fröhlich & Kerl, 
2012), and cooperation– in the form of a symbiotic relationship, as well as trust 
and harmony (see Pfetsch & Wehmeier, 2002, p. 85). Both have to be considered 
within a situation analysis prior to the planned game theoretical considerations. 
These new theoretical and methodological reflections require a deductive 
approach. The research design therefore must include both: the exchange of 
resources (information and publicity), and the allocation of influence which 
derives from rules of the game (Charron, 1989) that need to be developed for 
political media relations. Individual interaction settings in this context lead to 
different rules of the game and also to different games (see Holzinger, 2003, p. 
176). One can, for example, assume that the head of the organizational 
communication department has a wider scope in deciding to cooperate than one of 
the staff members. The situations in which their decisions are embedded, as well as 
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their perceptions of the network, differ, (see Johnson & Orbach, 2002) and 
therefore different rules of the game must underlie the game theoretical 
considerations. 
 
The players in a political-media communication network do not interact only once, 
but they can draw on experiences they had with other players. In game theoretical 
analysis it is often assumed that the same players interact. But if the combination 
of game theory and network analysis is pursued, players, who are functionally and 
structurally equivalent within the network, will consequently emerge in similar 
game situations. Political media relations in this case could also be conceptualized 
as repeated games with varying actors (respectively: opponents) (see Fudenberg & 
Tirole, 1991, p. 168).  
 
Buskens (1999, p. 58), who game-theoretically examines trust in social networks, 
felt that studies which are conceptualized as games with varying opponents cannot 
describe social networks in detail (e.g. Kreps, 1990). Those concepts would assume 
that new actors would know what had happened before they joined the game. That 
is why those assumptions would lead to the same results as models in which the 
same players always interact. Moreover, Buskens criticizes that influences like 
basic distrust of the actors, and pre-established reputation, are not considered in 
those concepts. Aside from the fact that these problems can be avoided in future 
studies, game theory indeed distinguishes between games with and without 
information. If a game is repeated and the new player has no information about his 
opponent, because it is the first interplay and there is no instance or community to 
inform the player, non-cooperation is the most rational game strategy (see 
Milgrom, North & Weingast, 1990). If the community, on the other hand, is small 
and interconnected enough, it may be possible that the player can get information 
about his opponent. Uncooperative players could therefore be sanctioned in the 
interest of the community. 
 
The reflections up to this point refer only to the player’s degree of integration 
within the network and the influence of that integration on his rational play 
behavior. As mentioned before, a profound analysis of strategic interplays within 
the political-media communication network is grounded on diverse assumptions 
about the social situation as well as about the characteristics of the players 
themselves (see Holzinger, 2000, p. 3f.). In the logic of game theory the relevant 
characteristics of the actors derive from different cost-benefit ratios. 
 
 
Applicability in a Transcultural Perspective 
 
Strategic decisions in the management of communication with the media are 
influenced by a number of factors on different levels of analysis (see Frandsen & 
Johansen, 2010, p. 303). On a macro level it may be factors like laws, cultural 
norms, as well as the structure of the communication network itself. Furthermore, 
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organizational and personal factors on a meso and a micro level, like self-
perceptions, influence the strategic behavior of the players in the network.  
 
All these factors may be part of what can be described as media cultures. Bignell 
(2000, p. 5), for example, broadly defines them as "a terrain on which 
communication between people in a concrete historic-economic situation takes 
place". This underlines that the national context in which political media relations 
are being discussed is important (see Hepp & Wessler, 2008). Therefore, analyzing 
games (or cases) comparatively appears to be beneficial and will therefore be 
illustrated in the following section.  
 
While putting the outlined ideas into practice from a comparative perspective, one 
has to keep in mind the different game situations of the players that derive from 
the characteristics of the players as well as from context factors like different 
media systems and media cultures that form the social situation the players are 
embedded in. A comparative application of this model is probably easier to realize 
for environments that are similar, for example in relation to the influence of state 
authorities on the media (e.g. Germany and the U.S.), than with countries that 
differ in that regard (e.g. Germany and the Russian Federation, see Blum, 2005, p. 
9f.). 
 
In accordance with the most different systems design of John Stuart Mill (see 
Esser 2003, p. 466) Russia is chosen as an illustration for the following discussion 
of a comparative perspective of the concept outlined so far. By taking a closer look 
at its political journalism and political public relations, it becomes clear that media 
relations are embedded in an entirely different social situation than for example in 
Germany or the United States (overview: Pasti, Chernysh & Svitich, 2012). As 
stated before, this social situation and its careful analysis are the basis for game 
theoretical considerations.  
 
Although public relations research in the Russian Federation is done almost 
exclusively via case studies, which describe functions and practices (Tsetsura, 
2003, p. 659), they are insightful: “zakazukha” (paid public relations without 
checking facts, see ibid., p. 665) are interesting, as they inform game theoretical 
assumptions on the micro level that are distinctly neo-classical and thus do not 
reflect the ethical norms of the international associations Russian professionals 
have joined (e.g. International Public Relations Association) (Tsetsura, 2004, p. 
343f.). Moreover, on the macro level the advertising law which does not specify the 
difference between hidden advertising and political public relations (ibid.) could 
influence the behavior of the actors within the communication network in Russia 
as in regions outside the big cities journalistic publications based on press releases 
are reprimanded by the Antimonopoly Committee and its regional departments 
(ibid.). Without further research it is hard to say how these conditions will 
influence network patterns and strategic behavior within the political-media 
communication network. 
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In order to analyze the strategic interactions within this network, the situation and 
self-perceptions of Russian journalists are at least as important as the situation of 
political public relations in Russia. Wu, Weaver, and Johnson (1996, p. 538) who 
conducted a comparative survey of American and Russian journalists found that 
the most important role of Russian journalists is that of the disseminator of 
information. They interpret this finding as an effect carried over “from Soviet days 
when information and facts were highly valued commodities, too often 
inaccessible” (ibid.). The comparatively weak self-perception, as critics of the 
government, underlines their interpretation that "journalists share leadership with 
state officials" (see also Behmer et al., 2011). The most striking difference between 
American and Russian journalists was the active role as agenda setter, which was 
twelve times as high in Russia as it was in the United States. This supports not only 
the explanation of the authors that Russian journalists fulfill ideological and 
propaganda functions but this finding is also in line with the rising relevance of 
Internet communication and online journalism. In addition to the highly 
influential nationwide TV channels that are directly controlled by the Russian 
government, new, qualitative and state independent online media outlets evolve 
that are considered as important and trustworthy sources especially in big cities 
(see Pörzgen, 2011). What is latently striking in conversations with Russian 
journalists from online media, namely the impression that they do not only report 
about but are themselves political activists, is also revealed in Wu et al. (1996): 
"Russian journalists see themselves playing a role as creative, independent agents 
in the Russian social and political contexts" (ibid., p. 544). 
 
From these two different logics of political journalism in Russia, different 
rationalities in the behavior of the actors can be derived, outlining two separate 
communication networks of political journalists and communication professionals 
of political organizations in Russia. As TV channels and other state controlled 
media are considered as part of the political elite, their behavior probably will be as 
cooperative and closely connected to governmental organizations as one can 
imagine. Independent newspapers and online media, on the other hand, who 
perceive themselves as political activists of their own kind -not necessarily as 
opposition- have no need to cooperate with state institutions in this political 
environment. They will probably closely cooperate with non-governmental 
organizations or even be an active member of them. Even so, as mentioned before, 
much more elaborate research of political journalism and public relations in 
Russia, as well as more comparative studies, are needed in order to derive reliable 
and valid assumptions about the interactions within the political-media 
communication network(s) in Russia. Despite all complications that could be 
connected with the aforementioned methods of semi-structured interviews in 
Russia, this approach would definitely be a gain for the comparative analysis of 
political-media relations, since only journalists’ attitudes and not their actual 
behavior were comparatively measured in Russia and the United States (ibid., p. 
545). 
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To summarize: these mentioned points serve as a glimpse into the possible 
influences on the strategic behavior of Russian journalists and communication 
professionals of political organizations. The first sections clearly pointed out that 
in the limited national context of one country alone, the implementation of the 
outlined concept is highly ambitious. The problems connected with applying a 
rational choice approach merely stay the same on a comparative level (see Sciulli, 
1992). This means that only after testing the presented ideas in a limited context 
will it be possible to state reliable consequences and perspectives about a possible 
applicability in a comparative perspective of communication research. 
 
 
Conclusion and Perspectives 
 
The article started by criticizing the general assumption that communication 
activities of political organizations are regarded as strategic, per se, although 
strategy concepts are imaginably diverse. Up to now, integrative concepts of 
strategy remained largely theoretical. By applying the introduced design of social 
network analysis and game theory integrative strategy concepts may for the first 
time become empirically observable in the form of involved actors’ communication 
tactics. Thereby different approaches to the concept of strategy may be compared 
empirically as well as theoretically. From a transcultural comparative perspective, 
the article has shown that different social contexts result in different game 
scenarios and different logics of strategy. The Russian example illustrated that on 
the micro level journalists’ self-perceptions as disseminators of information as well 
as on a macro level a law which does not specify the difference between hidden 
advertising and political public relations result in a completely different 
interaction situation than in the German context. 
 
The interaction of political journalists and communication professionals are 
regularly described with the metaphor of a “game”, yet a game theoretical analysis, 
in this context, has only been done by using fixed scenarios unsuited to handle the 
complexities of these interactions. Insofar future research of political-media 
relations may be able to make the game metaphor applicable by following the track 
outlined here. Multi-level analyses, the inclusion of empirical explanatory 
perspectives, as well as multistep-precisions have been discussed as possible 
measures for a reasonable application of rational choice assumptions. 
 
These considerations may serve as a first intermediate step on the way of 
integrating rational choice into the concept of strategic political communication. 
That is naturally an open-ended process with the goal to gain information about 
possible gaps that are still needed to be filled. Nevertheless, this article showed 
that social network analysis in political-media relations by due consideration of 
different social contexts may be able to integrate separated approaches of strategy. 
It can serve as infrastructure for a descriptive analysis as well as environment for 
testing cost-benefit-considerations with the help of game theory. Therefore, it 
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allows for a systematic integration of different strategy concepts as well as for a 
comparative evaluation of their validity and explanatory power for empirical ex-
post analyses. 
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